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Abstract: This article explores the implications of making the cultural turn in the 
engagement of economic and political geography with issues of political economy. It 
seeks to steer a path between a fetishistic, reified economics that naturalizes 
economic categories and a soft economic sociology that focuses on the similarities 
between economic and other socio-cultural activities at the expense of the specificity 
of the economic. We show how combining critical semiotic analysis with an 
evolutionary and institutional approach to political economy offers one interesting 
way to achieve this goal. An evolutionary and institutional approach to semiosis 
enables us to recognize the semiotic dimensions of political economy at the same 
time as establishing how and why only some economic imaginaries among the many 
that circulate actually come to be selected and institutionalized; and Marxian political 
economy enables us to identify the contradictions and conflicts that make capital 
accumulation inherently improbable and crisis-prone, creating the space for 
economic imaginaries to play a role in stabilizing accumulation in specific spatio-
temporal fixes and/or pointing the way forward from recurrent crises. The paper 
illustrates these arguments with a case study on the Flemish ‘anchoring debate’ as a 
specific regional economic development strategy. It concludes with a set of 
guidelines for the further development of cultural political economy. 
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Cultural Political Economy: on Making the Cultural Turn without Falling into 
Soft Economic Sociology 
 
This contribution aims to redirect the cultural turn(s) in economic and political 
geography by making and illustrating the case for a distinctive approach to ‘cultural 
political economy’ (hereafter CPE refers to this approach and not to the wider set of 
cultural turns in political economy).1 This combines concepts and tools from critical 
semiotic analysis with others from critical political economy to produce a distinctive 
post-disciplinary approach to the analysis of capitalist social formations (cf. Jessop 
and Sum 2001). While it is not demonstrated here, CPE can also be applied to non-
capitalist economic and political orders by combining a critical analysis of the 
production of intersubjective meaning (i.e., semiosis) with concepts suited to such 
orders and their institutional dynamics. One of the key differences between CPE and 
other approaches that make a cultural turn is its explicit integration of the general 
evolutionary mechanisms of variation, selection, and retention into semiotic analysis 
and, in particular, its concern with the path-dependent co-evolution of the semiotic 
and extra-semiotic aspects of actually existing political economies. In other words, 
we take for granted the path-shaping potential of economic imaginaries (in their 
different forms and varying content) and seek to explain why only some economic 
imaginaries among the many that circulate actually come to be selected and 
institutionalized and thereby come to co-constitute economic subjectivities, interests, 
activities, organizations, institutions, structural ensembles, emergent economic 
orders and their social embedding, and the dynamics of economic performance. We 
also emphasize that these general evolutionary mechanisms are mediated in and 
through the distinctive forms and institutional dynamics of capitalism (or other forms 
of political economy) as well as through the general features of semiosis. Indeed, it 
seems that the relative importance of institutional materiality increases from the stage 
of variation in economic and political imaginaries through the stage when they are 
selectively translated into specific material practices and institutional dynamics to the 
stage when they are embodied in a structurally coherent set of social relations and a 
spatio-temporal fix compatible with continued accumulation (see below).  
 
Combining the semiotic and extra-semiotic in this way facilitates two lines of 
investigation of particular relevance to economic, political, and cultural geography. 
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First, given the infinity of meaningful communications and (mis)understandings 
enabled by semiosis, how do extra-semiotic as well as semiotic factors affect the 
variation, selection, and retention of particular instances of semiosis and their 
associated practices in ordering, reproducing and transforming capitalist social 
formations and their various spatio-temporal features? Second, given the 
contradictions, dilemmas, indeterminacy, and overall improbability of capitalist 
reproduction, especially during its recurrent crises, what role does semiosis play in 
construing, constructing, and temporarily stabilizing capitalist social formations at 
least within specific spatio-temporal fixes and their zones of relative stability even as 
it displaces and defers conflicts, contradictions, and crisis-tendencies elsewhere 
and/or into the future?2 In regard to both questions, we argue, as noted above, that 
the relative weight of semiotic and extra-semiotic mechanisms changes over the 
analytically distinct, but frequently empirically overlapping, steps of variation, 
selection, and retention. After elaborating the general case for CPE, we illustrate it 
from the emergence, selection, and attempted implementation of two successive 
economic imaginaries that have informed economic policies in Belgium: the Belgian 
and Flemish ‘anchoring’ strategies. We conclude with a set of guidelines for the 
further development of cultural political economy. 
 
Cultural Political Economy 
 
Arguments in favour of ‘cultural political economy’ seem to have emerged in several 
contexts during the 1990s as part of and/or in response to the cultural turn. The 
present version was developed by scholars at Lancaster University3 drawing on a far 
wider range of sources. But it was prefigured in some major versions of critical 
political economy and in some ‘old institutionalisms’ and it has significant parallels in 
a range of contemporary disciplinary and trans-disciplinary endeavours.4 Among 
recent geographical studies, for example, we can note the contrasting approaches of 
Barnett (2004), Crang (1997), Hudson (2004), Mitchell (2000), Sayer (2001), and 
Thrift (2004). Our CPE approach has three defining features. First, like other currents 
in evolutionary and institutional political economy and unlike the more usual generic 
studies of semiosis, CPE opposes transhistorical analyses, insisting that both history 
and institutions matter. This is where the strategic-relational dialectic of path-
dependency and path-shaping and its associated emphasis on the evolutionary 
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mechanisms of variation, selection, and retention (Campbell 1969) have a key role in 
shaping the dynamics of semiosis. Second, unlike many currents in evolutionary and 
institutional political economy but like other variants of cultural materialism, CPE 
takes the cultural turn seriously, highlighting the complex relations between 
meanings and practices. For the production of intersubjective meaning is crucial to 
the description, understanding, and explanation of economic and political conduct 
just as it is for other types of behaviour and their emergent properties. And, third, 
building on these two features, CPE focuses on the co-evolution of semiotic and 
extra-semiotic processes and their conjoint impact on the constitution and dynamic of 
capitalist formations. This general approach can be re-stated in terms of four broad 
claims about the role of semiosis in the critique of political economy. 
 
Ontologically, semiosis has a key role in the overall constitution of specific social 
objects and social subjects and, a fortiori, in their co-constitution and co-evolution in 
wider ensembles of social relations. Thus CPE rejects two related tendencies in 
orthodox political economy: (a) the tendency to naturalize or reify its theoretical 
objects (such as land, machines, the division of labour, production, money, 
commodities, the information economy); and (b) the tendency to offer thin accounts, 
at most, of how subjects and subjectivities are formed and how different modes of 
calculation emerge, come to be institutionalized, and get modified. For CPE, 
technical and economic objects are always socially constructed, historically specific, 
more or less socially embedded in – or disembedded from – broader networks of 
social relations and institutional ensembles, more or less embodied and ‘embrained’ 
in individual actors, and require continuing social 'repair' work for their reproduction. 
The same points hold for the objects of orthodox political science and (neo-)realist 
international relations theory. The former tends to treat the state as a set of 
governmental institutions used by state managers and other political forces to pursue 
interests that are objectively grounded in their respective social positions. Realist and 
neo-realist international relations theory also naturalizes interests in explaining the 
necessary logic of state action. In contrast, the Lancaster CPE approach follows 
Marx, Gramsci, and Poulantzas (among others) in studying the state in its inclusive 
sense (‘political society + civil society’) as a social relation. This approach regards 
state power as the discursively- and institutionally-mediated condensation of a 
changing balance of forces. It examines struggles to shape the identities, 
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subjectivities, and interests of the forces engaged in political struggle as well as to 
transform the state system and its various selectivities. Moreover, in revealing the 
socially constructed nature of the phenomena of political economy, CPE involves a 
form of political intervention that goes beyond Ideologiekritik (which serves at best to 
uncover the ideal and material interests behind specific meaning systems and 
ideologies) to explore the semiotic and extra-semiotic mechanisms involved in 
selecting and consolidating the dominance and/or hegemony of some meaning 
systems and ideologies over others (see below). 
 
Epistemologically, inspired by the Marxian critique of political economy, our approach 
to CPE not only critiques the categories and methods of orthodox political economy 
but also emphasizes the contextuality and historicity of all claims to knowledge. It 
follows that a self-consistent CPE calls for reflexivity on the part of social scientists 
about the conditions of their own practices. At the same time, in stressing the 
materiality of social relations and their emergent properties, CPE aims to avoid the 
temptations of pure social constructivism, according to which social reality is 
reducible to participants’ meanings and understandings of their social world. This sort 
of reductionism generates an arbitrary account of the social world that ignores the 
unacknowledged conditions of action as well as the many and varied emergent 
properties of action that go un- or mis-recognized by the relevant actors. It also 
ignores the many and varied struggles to transform the conditions of action, actors’ 
meanings and understandings, and to modify emergent properties. In short, CPE 
notes both the constitutive role of semiosis and the emergent extra-semiotic features 
of social relations and their impact on capacities for action and transformation. 
 
Methodologically, CPE combines concepts and tools from critical semiotic analysis 
with those from critical political economy. Semiosis is an umbrella term for different 
approaches to the cultural turn insofar as they assume both that semiosis is causally 
efficacious as well as meaningful. This implies that actual events and processes and 
their emergent effects can be explained, at least in part, as well as interpreted in 
terms of semiosis. Thus CPE studies the role of semiotic practices not only in the 
continual (re-)making of social relations but also in the contingent emergence 
(variation), privileging (selection), ongoing realization (retention), and subsequent 
reinforcement through structural coupling (consolidation) of their extra-semiotic 
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properties. It is the continuing interaction between the semiotic and extra-semiotic in 
a complex co-evolutionary process of variation, selection, and retention that gives 
relatively successful economic and political imaginaries their performative, 
constitutive force in the material world. Our case study illustrates this below (for other 
Lancaster examples, see Jessop 2004; Sum 2004, 2005). 
 
Substantively, CPE affirms the overall complexity of the social world and the cognate 
importance of complexity reduction as a condition of social action. Adopting a 
strategic-relational approach to this process, it assumes that complexity reduction 
involves discursively-selective ‘imaginaries’ and structurally-selective institutions. 
Imaginaries are semiotic systems that provide the basis for the lived experience of an 
inordinately complex world; institutions provide the means of embedding lived 
experience in broader social relations and, perhaps, rendering it consistent across 
different social spheres. Transferring these abstract ideas to what orthodox 
economics misleadingly describes as the macro-level, CPE distinguishes the 
‘actually existing economy’ as the chaotic sum of all economic activities (broadly 
defined as concerned with the social appropriation and transformation of nature for 
the purposes of substantive provisioning)5 from the 'economy' (or, better, 'economies' 
in the plural) as an imaginatively narrated, more or less coherent subset of these 
activities occurring within specific spatio-temporal frameworks. The totality of 
economic activities is so unstructured and complex that it cannot be an object of 
effective calculation, management, governance, or guidance. Instead such practices 
are always oriented to subsets of economic relations (economic systems, 
subsystems, or ensembles) that have been semiotically and, perhaps 
organizationally and institutionally, fixed as appropriate objects of intervention. 
 
We argue that economic imaginaries have a crucial constitutive role in this regard. An 
economic imaginary is a semiotic order, i.e., a specific configuration of genres, 
discourses and styles and, as such, constitutes the semiotic moment of a network of 
social practices in a given social field, institutional order, or wider social formation 
(Fairclough 2003). Thus an economic imaginary (re-)articulates various genres, 
discourses, and styles around a particular conception of the economy and its extra-
economic conditions of existence. Economic imaginaries are always selectively 
defined – due to limited cognitive capacities and to the discursive and material biases 
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of specific epistemes and economic paradigms. They typically exclude elements – 
usually unintentionally – that are vital to the overall performance of the subset of 
economic (and extra-economic) relations that have been identified. Such exclusions 
limit in turn the efficacy of economic forecasting, management, planning, guidance, 
governance, etc., because such practices do not (indeed, cannot) take account of 
excluded elements and their impact. Moreover, if they are to prove more than 
‘arbitrary, rationalistic, and willed’ (Gramsci 1971: 376-7), these imaginaries must 
have some significant, albeit necessarily partial, correspondence to real material 
interdependencies in the actually existing economy and/or in the relations between 
economic and extra-economic activities. Similar arguments would apply, with 
appropriate changes, to so-called meso- or micro-level economic phenomena, such 
as industrial districts or individual enterprises (see below). 
.  
Imagined economies are discursively constituted and materially reproduced on many 
sites and scales, in different spatio-temporal contexts, and over various spatio-
temporal horizons. They extend from one-off transactions through stable economic 
organizations, networks, and clusters to ‘macro-economic’ regimes. While massive 
scope for variation typically exists at an individual transactional level, the medium- to 
long-term semiotic and material reproduction requirements of meso-complexes and 
macro-economic regimes narrow this scope considerably. The recursive selection of 
semiotic practices and extra-semiotic processes at these scales tends to reduce 
inappropriate variation and to secure the ‘requisite variety’ (constrained heterogeneity 
rather than simple uniformity) that supports the structural coherence of economic 
activities. Indeed stable semiotic orders, discursive selectivities, social learning, path-
dependencies, power relations, patterned complementarities, and material 
selectivities all become more significant, the more that material interdependencies 
and/or issues of spatial and intertemporal articulation increase in and across diverse 
functional systems and the lifeworld. Yet this growing set of constraints also reveals 
the fragility and, indeed, improbability of the smooth reproduction of complex social 
orders. This highlights the importance of retaining an appropriate repertoire of 
semiotic and material resources and practices that can be flexibly and reflexively 
deployed in response to emerging disturbances and crises (cf. Grabher 1994).  
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Economic imaginaries at the meso- and macro-levels develop as economic, political, 
and intellectual forces seek to (re)define specific subsets of economic activities as 
subjects, sites, and stakes of competition and/or as objects of regulation and to 
articulate strategies, projects and visions oriented to these imagined economies. 
These forces tend to manipulate power and knowledge to secure recognition of the 
boundaries, geometries, temporalities, typical economic agents, tendencies and 
counter-tendencies, distinctive overall dynamic, and reproduction requirements of 
different imagined economies (Daly 1991; Miller and Rose 1993). They also seek to 
develop new structural and organizational forms that will help to institutionalize these 
boundaries, geometries, and temporalities in an appropriate spatio-temporal fix that 
can displace and/or defer capital’s inherent contradictions and crisis-tendencies. 
However, by virtue of competing economic imaginaries, competing efforts to institute 
them materially, and an inevitable incompleteness in the specification of their 
respective economic and extra-economic preconditions, each 'imagined economy' is 
only ever partially constituted. There are always interstitial, residual, marginal, 
irrelevant, recalcitrant and plain contradictory elements that escape any attempt to 
identify, govern, and stabilize a given 'economic arrangement' or broader 'economic 
order' (Jessop 2002). These provide important sources of resistance and help 
preserve a reservoir of semiotic and material resources that enable dominant 
systems (through the agency of their associated social forces) to adapt to new 
challenges through their re-articulation and recombination in the service of power. 
 
Relatively successful economic imaginaries have their own, performative, constitutive 
force in the material world.6 For their operation presupposes a substratum of 
substantive economic relations and instrumentalities as their elements; in addition, 
where an imaginary is successfully operationalized and institutionalized, it transforms 
and naturalizes these elements and instrumentalities into moments of a specific 
economy with specific emergent properties. For economic imaginaries identify, 
privilege, and seek to stabilize some economic activities from the sum of economic 
relations and turn them into objects of observation, calculation, and governance. 
Technologies of economic governance, operating sometimes more semiotically, 
sometimes more materially,7 constitute their own objects of governance rather than 
governing already pre-constituted objects (Jessop 1990, 1997). 
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Taking for granted the general principles of critical semiotic analysis (Fairclough 
2003) to focus on broader evolutionary and institutional issues in political economy, 
we note that there is constant variation, witting or unwitting, in apparently routine 
social practices. This poses questions about the regularization of practices in normal 
conditions and about possible sources of radical transformation, especially in periods 
of crisis. The latter typically lead to profound cognitive and strategic disorientation of 
social forces and a corresponding proliferation in discursive interpretations and 
proposed material solutions. Nonetheless the same basic mechanisms serve to 
select and consolidate radically new practices and to stabilize routine practices. 
Simplifying the analysis of evolutionary mechanisms given in Fairclough et al. (2004) 
and extending it to include material as well as semiotic factors, a first cut at 
specifying these mechanisms suggests the following: 
 a) Continuing variation in discourses and practices, whether due to their 
incomplete mastery, their skilful adaptation in specific circumstances, new 
challenges or crises, or other semiotic or material causes.  
b) Selection of particular discourses (the privileging of just some available, 
including emergent, discourses) for interpreting events, legitimizing actions, and 
(perhaps self-reflexively) representing social phenomena. Semiotic factors 
operate here by influencing the resonance of discourses in personal, 
organizational and institutional, and broader meta-narrative terms and by limiting 
possible combinations of semiosis and semiotic practices in a given semiotic 
order. Material factors also operate here through conjunctural or institutionalized 
power relations, path-dependency, and structurally-inscribed selectivities. 
c) Retention of some resonant discourses (e.g., inclusion in an actor’s habitus, 
hexis, and personal identity, enactment in organizational routines, integrated into 
institutional rules, objectification in the built environment, material and intellectual 
technologies, and articulation into widely accepted accumulation strategies, state 
projects, or hegemonic visions). The greater the range of sites (horizontally and 
vertically)8 in which resonant discourses are retained, the greater is the potential 
for effective institutionalization and integration into patterns of structured 
coherence and durable compromise. The constraining influences of complex, 
reciprocal interdependences will also recursively affect the scope for retaining 
resonant discourses.  
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d) Reinforcement insofar as procedural devices exist that privilege these 
discourses and associated practices and also filter out contrary discourses and 
practices. This can involve both discursive selectivity (e.g., genre chains, styles, 
identities) and material selectivity (e.g., the privileging of certain dominant sites of 
discourse in and through structurally-inscribed strategic selectivities of specific 
organizational and institutional orders). Such mechanisms recursively strengthen 
appropriate genres, styles, and strategies and selectively eliminate inappropriate 
alternatives and are most powerful where they operate across many different 
sites to promote complementary discourses within the wider social ensemble. 
e) Selective recruitment, inculcation, and retention by relevant social groups, 
organizations, institutions, etc., of social agents whose predispositions fit 
maximally with the preceding requirements. 
 
This list emphasizes the role of semiosis and its material supports in securing social 
reproduction through the selection and retention of mutually supportive discourses. 
Conversely, the absence or relative weakness of one or more of these semiotic 
and/or extra-semiotic conditions may undermine previously dominant discourses 
and/or block the selection and retention of appropriate innovative discourses. This 
absence or weakness is especially likely in periods of profound disorientation due to 
rapid social change and/or crises that trigger major semiotic and material innovations 
in the social world. We should note here that the semiotic and extra-semiotic space 
for variation, selection, and retention is contingent, not pre-given. This also holds for 
the various and varying semiotic and material elements whose selection and 
retention occurs in this ‘ecological’ space. In a complex world there are many sites 
and scales on which such evolutionary processes operate and, for present purposes, 
what matters is how local sites and scales come to be articulated to form more global 
(general) sites and scales and how the latter in turn frame, constrain, and enable 
local possibilities (Wickham 1987). These interrelations are themselves shaped by 
the ongoing interaction between semiotic and extra-semiotic processes.  
 
Integrating Critical Semiotic Analysis into Political Economy 
 
A particularly interesting moment in the development of economic imaginaries is the 
emergence of crises affecting economic identities and performance. A CPE approach 
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implies that crisis is never a purely objective process or moment that automatically 
produces a particular response or outcome. Instead a crisis emerges when 
established patterns of dealing with structural contradictions, their crisis-tendencies, 
and dilemmas no longer work as expected and, indeed, when continued reliance 
thereon may even aggravate the situation. Crises are most acute when crisis-
tendencies and tensions accumulate across several interrelated moments of the 
structure or system in question, limiting room for manoeuvre in regard to any 
particular problem. Changes in the balance of forces mobilized behind and across 
different types of struggle also have a key role in intensifying crisis-tendencies and in 
weakening and/or resisting established modes of crisis-management (Offe 1984: 35-
64). This creates a situation of more or less acute crisis, a potential moment of 
decisive transformation, and an opportunity for decisive intervention. In this sense, a 
crisis situation is unbalanced: it is objectively overdetermined but subjectively 
indeterminate (Debray 1973: 113). And this creates the space for determined 
strategic interventions to significantly redirect the course of events as well as for 
attempts to 'muddle through' in the (perhaps forlorn) hope that the situation will 
resolve itself in time. In short, crises are potentially path-shaping moments.  
 
Such path-shaping is mediated semiotically as well as materially. Crises encourage 
semiotic as well as strategic innovation. They often prompt a remarkable proliferation 
of alternative visions rooted in old and new semiotic systems and orders. Many of 
these will invoke, repeat, or re-articulate established genres, discourses, and styles; 
others may develop, if only partially, a ‘poetry for the future’ that resonates with new 
potentialities (Marx 1996: 32-34). Which of the proliferating alternatives, if any, is 
eventually selected, retained and consolidated is mediated in part through discursive 
struggles to define the nature and significance of the crisis and what might follow 
from it. If the crisis can be interpreted as a crisis in the existing economic order, then 
minor reforms and a passive revolution will first be attempted to re-regularize that 
order. If this fails and/or if the crisis is already interpreted initially as a crisis of the 
existing economic order, a discursive space is opened to explore more radical 
changes. In both cases conflicts also concern how the costs of crisis-management 
get distributed and the best policies to escape from the crisis.  
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In periods of major social restructuring, diverse economic, political, and socio-cultural 
narratives may intersect as they seek to give meaning to current problems by 
construing them in terms of past failures and future possibilities. Different social 
forces in the private and public domains propose new visions, projects, programmes, 
and policies and a struggle for hegemony grows. The plausibility of these narratives 
and their associated strategies and projects depends on their resonance (and hence 
capacity to reinterpret and mobilize) with the personal (including shared) narratives of 
significant classes, strata, social categories, or groups affected by the postwar 
economic and political order. Moreover, although many plausible narratives are 
possible, their narrators will not be equally effective in conveying their messages and 
securing support for the lessons they hope to draw. This will depend on the prevailing 
‘web of interlocution’9 and its discursive selectivities, the organization and operation 
of the mass media, the role of intellectuals in public life, and the structural biases and 
strategically selective operations of various public and private apparatuses of 
economic, political, and ideological domination.10 Such concerns take us well beyond 
a concern for narrativity and/or the constraints rooted in specific organizational or 
institutional genres, of course, into the many extra-discursive conditions of narrative 
appeal and of stable semiotic orders. That these institutional and meta-narratives 
have powerful resonance does not mean that they should be taken at face value. All 
narratives are selective, appropriate some arguments, and combine them in specific 
ways. In this sense, then, one must consider what is left unstated or silent, what is 
repressed or suppressed in official discourse.  
 
The strategic-relational analysis of structure and agency in struggles over hegemony 
rests on the general evolutionary distinction between variation, selection, and 
retention. First, there is continuing variation in discourses as actors intentionally or 
unintentionally redefine the sites, subjects, and stakes of action and articulate 
innovative strategies, projects and visions. This is especially likely during crises, 
which often produce profound strategic disorientation and a proliferation of alternative 
discourses. Second, while most of this variation is arbitrary and short-lived, lacking 
long-term consequences for overall social dynamics, some semiotic innovations are 
selected. This occurs because they resonate discursively with other actors and social 
forces and/or because they are reinforced through various structural mechanisms. So 
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we must explore the discursive and extra-discursive mechanisms that select some 
discourses for further elaboration and effective articulation with other discourses.  
 
Discourses are most powerful where they operate across many sites and scales and 
can establish and connect local hegemonies into a more encompassing hegemonic 
project. These discourses will be retained (discursively reproduced, incorporated into 
individual routines, and institutionally embedded) when they are able to reorganize 
the balance of forces and guide supportive structural transformation. Although any 
given economic or political imaginary is only ever partially realized, those that 
succeed, at least in part, have their own performative, constitutive force in the 
material world – especially when they correspond to (or successfully shape) 
underlying material transformations, can mobilize different elites to form a new power 
bloc, can organize popular support, disorganize opposition, and marginalize 
resistance. They will be most successful when they establish a new spatiotemporal 
fix that can displace and/or defer capital’s inherent contradictions and crisis-
tendencies in the international political economy. In short, discourses and their 
related discursive chains can generate variation, have selective effects – reinforcing 
some discourses, filtering others out, and contribute to the differential retention 
and/or institutionalization of social relation through the recursive selection of certain 
genres, performances, and strategies (Jessop 2004).  
 
Economic Imaginaries and Region-Building 
 
‘The new regionalism’ is an umbrella term for research on how regions are 
constituted by, and constitutive of, social, economic and political relations and 
identities, especially in response to globalization (Paasi 2002). This poses the 
question of what constitutes a region or regional economy because, as Jones notes, 
the region has become a ‘slippery and somewhat meaningless concept for 
discussing differently scaled and territorialized economic, social, cultural and political 
assemblages’ (2004: 62). Approaching regions as historically and geographically 
contingent entities offers an escape from this conundrum by situating them in a multi-
scalar framework of administrative structures, functional economic and social ties 
and meanings invested in them by residents and outsiders. This solution can be 
enhanced by taking regional imaginaries and identities seriously as potentially key 
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factors in the co-constitution of the political and economic during the creation and 
institutionalization of regional economies (Agnew 2000; Jones 2004; Paasi 1991). 
We follow this approach in our study of Belgian and Flemish anchoring strategies, 
which rest on different conceptions of the Belgian space economy and its internal 
differentiation and have very different linkages with extra-economic values and 
identities. In exploring the selection of these strategies we show that history and 
institutions matter because of the changing articulation, instantiation, and spatial 
implications of three cleavages in the Belgian social formation: religion, language, 
and class. For economic imaginaries have been shaped by the social embedding of 
the economic order within this broader formation and successful pursuit of their 
associated strategies depends heavily on their extra-economic contexts and supports 
as well as on their purported economic feasibility. In this sense, CPE can contribute 
to the understanding of new regionalism because it promises to integrate semiotic 
factors into the analysis of the institutionalization of regional economies without 
falling into ‘soft economic sociology’. The latter tends to limit the cultural turn to the 
role of cultural factors as business assets in underpinning regional growth strategies 
and regional competitiveness and to ignore issues of power (cf. Lovering 2001).  
 
Our case study (conducted by Stijn Oosterlynck) develops a CPE account of the 
attempted restructuring of the Belgian space economy11 in response to globalization 
and its associated relativization of scale,12  focusing in this context on the Belgian 
‘anchoring’ concept and its subsequent translation into a distinctive but ambivalent 
Flemish ‘anchoring strategy’. In particular, it explores changing political and 
economic imaginaries, their mobilization of alternative ideas of economic nationalism, 
and the resulting tensions/convergences with more general political and economic 
restructuring. Moreover, drawing on the distinction between variation, selection, and 
retention, it shows that, even when certain regional imaginaries are discursively 
selected from a wider array and are translated into regional strategies pursued by 
major social forces, they may prove ‘arbitrary, rationalistic and willed’. In other words, 
they will not be retained (institutionalized) in a coherent set of sustainable, region-
building apparatuses and policies because they lack the necessary material and 
discursive supports to ensure their effective implementation and integration into a 
reproducible economic and political order. In such cases CPE suggests that there will 
be a renewed search for a plausible and effective imaginary. This is certainly the 
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case in Flanders, where the newly hegemonic imaginary, yet to be properly tested, 
appears to be liberalization (Oosterlynck 2006).  
 
The development of the Flemish region is rooted in the distinctive articulation of two 
structural trends in Belgian history: (a) territorialization of the Belgian language 
conflict and (b) the changing forms of regional uneven economic development. The 
two economic imaginaries (see below) that have proved most resonant in the recent 
anchoring debate are rooted in these historical developments and have contributed 
to the rise of the Flemish space economy as an object of strategic intervention 
without, however, transforming it in line with the strategic objectives of either of the 
corresponding anchoring strategies. We seek to explain this in CPE terms below. 
 
Territorialization of Belgium’s language problem and uneven economic development 
 
The ‘Belgian condition’ is commonly analysed in terms of three cleavages: language, 
religion and class (Huyse 1980). While it is tempting to take these cleavages for 
granted as primordial or objectively grounded in economic relations, a CPE approach 
interprets them as socially constituted bases of personal and collective identity, social 
practices, and social mobilization. Their durability as alternative lines of cleavage 
nonetheless depends on their embedding in material as well as discursive practices 
that are changing and changeable and whose relative weight and structural coupling 
can vary (and, indeed, be made to vary through appropriate strategic interventions) in 
space-time. Religion has been marginal in the anchoring debate but it was (and to 
some extent remains) a major constitutive force in Belgian life through the powerful 
material and ideological influence of the Christian church within the education 
system, in labour organization in Flanders (as opposed to its minor influence over the 
Walloon labour class), its support for Belgian francophone nation-building, and its 
links to moderate Flemish nationalism. Language is significant for the state as well as 
civil society because of the traditional strong francophone bias in recruiting state 
managers, elite formation more generally, and the organization (and fracturing) of 
power blocs and subaltern groups. And class is grounded, of course, in social 
relations of production that are differentially articulated with, and imprinted by, 
religious and linguistic differences. 
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These considerations open the space to explore the discursive and material factors 
and processes that shape the relative weight and differential articulation of these 
cleavages and their changing significance for social action in particular conjunctures. 
A CPE perspective would ask how social groups come to be constituted as collective 
subjects with their own distinctive modes of calculation – whether these are 
discursively and materially based in class, religious or ethno-linguistic differences or 
some combination thereof – and how these identities become consolidated as bases 
of social mobilization. An adequate answer requires a more critical and constructivist 
approach to the genealogy of these antagonisms. This is certainly more than we get 
in Mandel’s well-known analysis (1963) of the dialectic of region and class in 
Belgium. For, while we share his concern with the uneven economic development of 
the capitalist space economy, Mandel fails to examine how regions and their 
inhabitants were imagined and institutionalised as objects of economic, political, or 
social and as subjects whose primary identity was as class, religious, or linguistic 
subjects. He pre-supposes instead the historically immanent unification of the 
Belgian working class through the general logic of proletarianization and claims that 
this was blocked in the case of Flanders as regional conflicts intensified.  
 
To show that there was nothing pre-given, let alone unchanging, about these three 
cleavages, we show how each emerged and has been transformed over time and 
how all three have come to be articulated in different ways at different times. We also 
show that changes in their relative significance and structural coupling are mediated 
not only through emergent, unintended, and, perhaps, unacknowledged structural 
shifts but also through the mobilization of relevant social forces around competing 
social imaginaries. This requires a stylized CPE account of Belgian political economy 
as the history of the making, unmaking and remaking of collective subjects, their 
uneven institutionalisation, and the eventual consolidation into power structures. We 
address economic, linguistic, and religious identities in turn without seeking to imply 
through this order of presentation that the economy is somehow determinant, 
whether in the first or even last instance. 
 
From its emergence as a potential object of calculation and governance with the 
formation of an independent Belgian state in 1830, the Belgian economy experienced 
highly uneven development. High energy transport costs and a pivotal role for the 
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steel industry in economic development stimulated the rapid industrialization of the 
coal-rich Walloon provinces with some spillover into light industry and consumption 
goods (Vandermotten et al., 1990). In contrast, the Flemish provinces remained 
largely rural and underdeveloped, except for some industrial small pockets around 
Ghent (textiles) and Antwerp (port facilities). The seeds of change were planted in 
the 1880 economic crisis, however, which was concentrated in Wallonia. This 
destroyed the latter’s light industrial and consumer goods sectors and the resulting 
lack of diversification and investment became major factors in Walloon economic 
decline in the 20th century. The trend towards uneven development was intensified 
through the second industrial revolution following the Great Depression (1929-32) 
because this particularly benefited the Antwerp region without bringing much 
advantage to Wallonia. While the former gained from investments in non-ferrous 
metals, carbon- and petro-chemicals, and electricity generation linked partly to its 
strategic port location (Vandermotten, Saey and Kesteloot 1990). The selective 
nature of this industrialization wave and its close ties to the interests of frenchified 
national capital prevented the rise during this period of an autonomous Flemish 
space economy and an autonomous Flemish bourgeoisie. At the same time, the 
legacies of previous rounds of investment in Wallonia left little social or geographical 
room for an industrial restructuring policy. Accordingly Belgian national financial 
capital sought a new spatial fix in response to lack of investment opportunities in this 
regard by resorting to foreign investments, mainly in the Congo and China (cf. the 
general model in Harvey 1982). Paradoxically this pattern of uneven development 
between the Flemish and Walloon regions saw the final integration of a Belgian 
space economy based on the Antwerp-Brussels-Charleroi industrial axis. This was 
achieved through the centralization of capital on the national level, in which the 
Belgian holding company, Sociéte Générale, played a key role, so that it viewed the 
whole of the Belgian economy as a relatively unified object of economic calculation 
shaped by the dynamic of the so-called A-B-C axis.  
 
Regarding language, although a majority of the population still spoke various Flemish 
dialects when the Belgian state was created in 1830, the new government decreed 
that French would be the sole official language. This reflected the interests of the 
largely francophone elite, including frenchified ‘Flemings’ (Murphy 1988). At this time 
the language division was more social than geographical because the inhabitants of 
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Flanders and Wallonia saw themselves either as commoners with largely local 
identities or else as members of the national elite (Murphy 1988; Reynebeau 1995). 
The resulting primacy of social over regional-territorial division is reflected in the fact 
that the ‘Flemish movement’ that emerged soon after independence among middle 
class intellectuals pursued a liberal struggle for individual language rights and 
increased bilingualism rather than calling for segregation into unilingual spaces. Only 
in the early 20th century did the latter approach replace the liberal conception, which 
had envisaged the use of French in Flemish provinces. The turn against bilingualism 
was due to frustration with the slow progress of the language laws, the diffusion of 
regional-linguistic ideas because of earlier legislative and political developments, the 
introduction of universal male suffrage which increased the political power of the 
Flemings, and the associated wish to strengthen the Flemish movement’s social 
base by stressing regional commonalities and continuities at the expense of national 
integration under francophone dominance. It is important to note here that the 
regionalization of the language question was contingent on crucial political factors 
rather than something inscribed at birth in the very nature of the Belgian state. 
 
After the Second World War, ethno-linguistic consciousness expanded as issues only 
loosely linked with language gained regional sensitivity. The Royal Question and the 
second School Struggle are emblematic here. First, a sharp political controversy 
emerged in 1946 about King Leopold III’s political stance before and during the war 
(Reynebeau 2005). This was essentially an ideological confrontation between 
Catholics and atheist Socialists and turned on the strategy of the CVP, the Belgian 
catholic (later Christian Democrat) party, to use its support for the King to win an 
absolute political majority in the Belgian state by mobilizing the Flemish majority in 
Belgium as a whole and the Catholic majority in Flanders. A referendum was held in 
March 1950 on whether the King should step down or not; it gave Leopold III 57% of 
the votes. This seemed to divide the country into a conservative and catholic 
Flanders and an atheist and leftist Wallonia but the division between urban-industrial 
and rural-agrarian groupings was actually more significant. For, while a majority of 
the Flemings voted for the King, a majority of Walloons and Brussellois voted 
against. The ensuing stalemate was only resolved when Leopold III abdicated, 
signifying the failure of the Catholics’ absolute majority strategy. Yet Flemish 
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nationalists often present this outcome as a defeat of the Flemish majority at Walloon 
hands, reinforcing thereby claims about the repressive ‘francophone’ Belgian state. 
 
The ‘second school struggle’ was precipitated when the Christian-democrats (CVP), 
the biggest political party in Belgium, were ousted in 1954 by a socialist-liberal 
coalition government (Reynebeau 1995; Reynebeau 2005; Witte 1997). This 
reversed its predecessor’s pro-Catholic education policies, reactivating a crucial line 
of conflict between Belgium’s opposing political-ideological forces rooted in the 
nineteenth century competition between two cultural projects associated with the 
liberal (and later Socialist) party and the Catholic – later Christian-democrat – party 
respectively. One project was to build a secular national state, the other to promote 
the values of the catholic majority. This conflict was alleviated by a compromise that 
laid the basis of the Belgian pillarisation system. Public finance was granted to 
develop a catholic socio-cultural pillar, allowing the Church to maintain ideological 
control over its faith community, in return for its ceasing to contest Belgian nation- 
and state-building. The post-war development of mass education enabled Socialists 
and Liberals to break the resulting Catholic dominance in education by redirecting 
public finance towards state education. The Catholic pillar responded by mobilizing 
its grassroots in hard extra-parliamentary action. The dispute was resolved through a 
school pact in 1958 that increased resources for free (i.e., Catholic) education and 
relaxing controls on the expansion of state education. While this mainly an 
ideological conflict, it had a strong regional dimension because Catholics were over-
represented in Flanders and Socialists in Wallonia.  
 
Such issues show how ideological conflicts among Socialists, Liberals and Catholics 
could become intertwined with language politics (Huyse 1980; Reynebeau 1995). 
The latter gradually developed into a conflict between geographically separated 
communities defending different societal models. In particular, once the School Pact 
significantly reduced tensions between the Catholic and secular groupings, political 
energy in the 1960s and 1970s could turn to socio-economic issues and ethno-
linguistic conflicts (Witte 1997). These two conflicts converged in the strikes against 
the Unity Law in 1960 and 1961, prompted by the severe economic crisis of the 
1950s and the shifting of the economic centre of gravity in the ABC-axis towards 
Flanders due to massive postwar investment in this region by multinationals 
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(Vandermotten, Saey and Kesteloot 1990). These developments finally led the 
Walloon working class to interpret structural economic decline in terms of a growing 
polarization between Flanders’ dominance and Wallonia’s semi-peripheral status. 
 
The strikes against the Unity Law fused reactions to this regional uneven economic 
development with the ongoing territorialization of the language conflict. The Unity 
Law was proposed in 1960 by the government of the Flemish Christian-democrat 
Eyskens. It envisaged drastic cuts in social expenditures and higher indirect taxation 
to finance industrial modernisation and economic expansion, which were deemed 
necessary to overcome the long-term economic crisis (Eyskens 1988; Witte 1997). 
The proposal triggered a five-week general strike, paralysing industry in Wallonia and 
spreading to the Flemish ports of Antwerp and Ghent. The strike’s centre of gravity 
was in the heavy industries and in Wallonia. While the Christian trade union ACV, 
which is dominant in Flanders, supported ‘their’ minister, the ill-prepared Flemish 
socialist trade unionists and national socialist party never recognized the strike. 
Disillusioned by the Flemish reluctance to participate in the strike, some Walloon 
strike leaders despaired at what they saw as the stranglehold of a Flemish 
conservative and catholic parliamentary majority. In a decisive turn, they campaigned 
for the tools to pursue autonomous reforms of the Walloon industrial structure and 
thereby initiated the fusion of regional and labour movement struggles. This gave a 
decisive political-economic content to divisions that had previously been expressed in 
Wallonia in terms of Flemish ‘encroachment’ on the status of the French language. 
This shift also led to a turn from defence of the linguistic status quo to an offensive 
strategy to advance Walloon politico-economic interests in the new conjuncture.  
 
This conjuncturally-determined fusion of the Walloon working classes and the 
Walloon federalist movement was decisive in shaping the contrasting imaginaries 
that came to inform Flemish and Walloon regionalisation strategies. In sum, the 
combined force of regional uneven economic development and territorialization of the 
language conflict triggered political and economic communitarianism on regional 
lines. This shift gradually led to Belgium’s legal transformation from a unitary into a 
federal state between 1970 and 1993 (Van Istendael 1993) and provides the context 
for the Flemish anchoring debate. This is one of the most important debates 
concerning Flemish economic strategies in the last two decades and we now show 
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how the cultural and institutional resources developed during two centuries of Belgian 
history have been (and are still being) articulated into two economic imaginaries as 
competing bases for constructing the Flemish regional space economy.  
 
The anchoring debate 
 
In the late 1980s Belgium’s traditional welcome to multinational capital turned to fear 
about losing economic self-determination. This crystallised in the Belgian anchoring 
debate, triggered when the main Belgian holding company, Société Générale 
(hereafter SG), suffered a share raid in January 1988 by Carlo de Benedetti, an 
Italian investor. The debate concerned whether national decision-making power over 
the economic infrastructure is desirable and necessary to maintain a strong economy 
and fund welfare (Brockmans 1995, Daems and Van de Weyer 1993, Geens 1995). 
In this sense it turned on competing conceptions of the Belgian economy, its insertion 
into the European, Atlantic, and global economic order, the changing nature of 
economic competitiveness and its extra-economic conditions of existence, and the 
extent to which the ‘Belgian condition’ involved distinctive constraints and 
opportunities on the pursuit of national and regional economic strategies. What gave 
the anchoring debate its specificity in a period of general concern about the ability of 
national states to manage national economies in the interests of national citizens (cf. 
Jessop 2002) was, of course, the relative fragility of the Belgian state, economy, and 
sense of citizenship due to the changing articulation of the religious, linguistic, and 
territorial issues as well as the nature of Belgian bourgeoisie and other classes. 
 
The raid on SG was a shock because it had a crucial role in integrating the Belgian 
space economy and indirectly controlled over a third of the Belgian economy 
(Economist 1988). SG tried to stave off this hostile bid by (illegally) increasing its own 
capital. A week later a Belgian businessman, André Leysen, proposed a 
redistribution of SG shares in order to provide a Belgian anchor for SG and thus keep 
part of its economic decision-making power in domestic hands (Cottenier, De 
Boosere and Gounet 1989, Lamy 1990). But Leysen’s co-operation with SG 
foundered his Leysen’s financial and institutional links with the French holding 
Paribas. Paribas is the long-time rival of Suez, a French holding which in 1987 had 
established cross-participations with SG as mutual protection against hostile take-
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overs. SG governor Lamy, who felt threatened by Leysens’ ambitions, asked Suez to 
intervene in the acquisition struggle, which it did after some hesitation – inter alia 
because it feared becoming de Benedetti’s next target. After Leysen’s failure, 
Maurice Lippens of AG, Belgium’s biggest insurance company, made a second 
Belgian anchoring attempt. Lippens did reach an agreement with Suez and together 
they acquired a majority of SG. Belgian anchoring seemed to have been ‘realised’, 
albeit with a majority of French shares (van Waterschoot 1988). 
 
The Flemish business magazine Trends, a staunch promoter of Flemish as opposed 
to Belgian anchoring, initially welcomed the hostile bid on SG (Crols 1988b). For 
Flemish nationalists and politicians, SG was the symbol of the Belgian francophone 
economic elite, which, they felt, had always disregarded Flemings and blocked 
economic opportunities for Flanders. The then Trends chief editor, Frans Crols, wrote 
that Flemings felt liberated after “having been pushed into a servant’s role for 165 
years by the rentiers of the Koningsstraat”13 and that “this does not concern the 
Belgian economy, the raid is concerned with one third of the Belgian economy, the 
most outmoded and dormant”. Trends hailed the acquisition struggle as the final blow 
to the traditional Belgian francophone holding bourgeoisie and wrote optimistically 
about the opportunities this new situation offered Flanders. When Suez entered the 
scene, however, the tone of the Trends commentaries changed (see e.g. Crols 
1988a). Its intervention was portrayed as a friend’s service within the same traditional 
francophone establishment and was seized on by Flemish anchorers to attack 
Belgian anchoring as a Trojan horse intended to keep francophone control over the 
Flemish economy (Brockmans 1995).  
  
The strategy of Belgian anchoring failed for two main reasons. First, the takeover of 
SG removed the main anchor and guiding force of the Belgian space economy with 
the result that it was harder to maintain a coherent strategy. Second, the strategy’s 
national orientation was undermined as the Belgian economy and its social 
embedding experienced political-economic regionalisation on two fronts. For the 
Walloon and socialist labour movement blamed the deepening crisis of the Walloon 
economy on the conservative economic strategy of SG and other Belgian holdings; 
and many Flemish politicians became disillusioned with the Belgian holdings 
because they had, it was felt, contributed little to Flemish economic development. 
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This regionalisation process undermined the integrity of the Belgian political economy 
in which SG’s political-economic power was embedded and on which its social and 
symbolic reproduction depended. This regionalisation of hearts and minds explains 
why the Belgian state found it hard to take effective Belgian anchoring action even 
though Minister of Finance Eyskens and Minister for Economy Maystadt tried to 
defend ‘vital Belgian interests’ against de Benedetti (Crols 1988b; Crols 1988c; 
Foster 2000; Lamy 1990). For there was no consensus within the government and 
Belgium’s political-economic elite on how to respond to the acquisition struggle.  
  
While the anchoring theme was not retained on the Belgian scale for lack of political-
institutional and material supports, it still had strong discursive resonance in Flemish 
circles. Thus it informed, albeit without great public fanfare, the industrial policy of the 
Flemish government (1988-1992); this was led for a fourth time by Geens, whom we 
encountered above as one of the contributors to the Belgian anchoring debate. 
Flemish anchoring gained a much higher public profile in the next Flemish 
government, led by minister-president Van der Brande, from 1992, when it became 
official Flemish government policy. For it became the main economic imaginary 
promoted by various state agencies and public bodies (Oosterlynck 2006; Van den 
Brande et al. 1992). The central element in this imaginary was the ‘French threat’ as 
French companies were depicted as disproportionately present in ‘strategic sectors’ 
of the Belgian economy, such as utilities, banks, insurance companies and holdings 
(Brockmans 1995; Vlaamse Culturele Koepel and Vereniging Vlaamse Leerkrachten 
1995). Flemish anchorers also criticised the extended network of cross-participations 
that included French investors active in Belgium as well as the French government’s 
steering role in these networks. They even suggested that the French investors were 
part of a French geo-political strategy intended to bind the Belgian into the French 
space economy in order to counter the growing influence of a re-unified Germany in 
constructing Europe. ‘Christmas trees’ of interacting shareholderships were depicted 
(Oosterlynck 2005a) and autonomy indexes developed to highlight the perceived 
French threat (Vlaamse Culturele Koepel and Vereniging Vlaamse Leerkrachten 
1995). These indexes reveal Flemish anchorers’ mode of calculation. Flanders’ 
autonomy index was allegedly unbalanced because only 18.9% of companies 
located there are owned by Flemings, whereas Wallonia’s index is balanced because 
69.6% of the companies are in francophone ownership. Francophone here includes 
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Walloon, francophone Belgian and French. Thus Flemish anchorers assume some 
kind of ‘natural’ affinity between Wallonia, francophone Belgium (which also includes 
Brussels) and France. The use of this index and similar representations resonated 
well with Flemish public opinion because the Flemish imaginaries treat all 
francophone Belgians as having the same values and interests. This is false 
(Oosterlynck 2005b; Quévit 1978). There have always been tensions between the 
Walloon movement, which focuses on economic issues and Walloon popular culture, 
and francophone Brussels, with its strong attachment to French high culture and the 
defence of the pure French language (Kesteloot 2004). These tensions were 
reinforced by Walloon frustration with the withdrawal of francophone holding capital 
from its economy, especially after the strikes against the Unity Law in 1960/1961.  
  
The central position of the perceived French threat in the Flemish anchoring debate 
is one of two key dimensions of the Flemish economic imaginary, namely, the 
narration of globalization in Flanders as French colonization. This imaginary proved 
quite powerful, although de Grauwe’s research on FDI between 1980 and 1990 
shows that it was based on a selective reading of economic trends (De Grauwe 
1992). Although France had the biggest share of FDI in this period, namely 30%, the 
FDI stream was concentrated in 1988 and 1989, i.e. the years in which Suez bought 
the Société Générale. Outside these two years, French FDI was in third place behind 
Germany (26.4%) and the Netherlands (21.2%). Daems similarly notes that the 
French were responsible for 59 of the 222 take-overs in 1985-90 compared to 57 
made by the Dutch (Daems and Van de Weyer 1993). In addition to its exaggerated 
fear of the French, the Flemish globalization imaginary is based on the idea of 
mutually exclusive spaces. This second dimension is rooted, like the first, in the 
demand for linguistic territorial integrity and historic fear of French dominance. The 
spatially segregated unilingualism and the federal solution to manage a distinctive 
‘communautarian’ politics that are the legacy of the historical struggle of the Flemish 
movement made the Flemish public opinion and elites more receptive to such 
imaginaries. Discourses based on the idea that two actors cannot occupy the same 
place were transmitted from the cultural and political to the economic domain so that 
the French economic presence was narrated as foreign ‘penetration’ that would 
undermine Flemish control over its economy.  
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Flemish anchorers unsurprisingly rejected the arguments of Daems and De Grauwe 
and replied that it was not the relative share of foreign ownership that mattered but its 
concentration in ‘strategic’ economic sectors (Oosterlynck 2004b). Strategic 
importance was variously defined in terms of employment, technological and 
innovative content, export volume, importance for social capital (e.g. media), 
importance for underlying competitiveness and strategic needs of Flemish economy, 
and being part of Flemish industrial heritage (Crols 1995; Oosterlynck 2004a; 
Vlaamse Culturele Koepel and Vereniging Vlaamse Leerkrachten 1995). Thus 
strategic importance is a vague idea that can be applied to large parts of the Flemish 
economy. This is especially clear in the discursive use of the term in the Flemish 
geo-economic strategy developed by Van den Brande. As minister-president of the 
new Flemish government, he was looking for ways to link Flemish state formation to 
Flemish nation formation (Blommaert 2000). With cultural and political autonomy 
already largely acquired, like many Flemish nationalists, he felt that Flanders also 
needed economic emancipation. His government’s anchoring strategy aimed to 
transform Flanders from a nation of SMEs without home-grown multinationals into a 
‘real’ economic nation. The government believed that a Flemish majority or 
controlling ownership was needed to anchor a company (Vlaamse Culturele Koepel 
and Vereniging Vlaamse Leerkrachten 1995). This approach has been challenged by 
an alternative strategy based, not on ownership, but on strategic decision-making 
power. The Flemish economist, Daems, defines this as the ability to determine 
company strategy (product developments, production technologies and export 
markets) at local level (Daems 1998; Daems and Van de Weyer 1993). This would 
be possible because, if companies were to apply corporate governance standards 
(thereby ending traditional holding structures that enable small minorities to control 
large blocks of shares), the separation between shareholders and managers would 
give Flemish management enough autonomy to take strategic decisions.  
 
The preceding paragraph illustrates the existence of two approaches to Flemish 
anchoring, based on national ‘ownership’ and corporate governance respectively. 
These concerns are rooted in different approaches to economic nationalism, i.e., to 
the role of the national as an intermediate scale of interest between the individual 
and humanity (Helleiner 2002). The nationalist ontology asks how a given nation can 
attain power and prosperity, which implies that the people who comprise a nation 
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somehow share a common economic fate and have an economic responsibility 
towards their fellow citizens (Reich 1991). The ownership variant of anchoring 
strategies is clearly informed by the traditional economic nationalist imaginary in 
which, in Reich’s words, ‘the well-being of citizens was linked to the success of the 
national economy, which depended in turn on the success of its giant corporations’ 
(1991: 34). The corporate governance variant is, for Reich again, more attuned to a 
new conception of economic nationalism as transformed by globalization. What 
matters for the nation’s future wealth is not a company’s nationality but the skills of 
the local workforce and managers. Thus this variant stresses the importance of local 
management experience. To ensure that they can manage without shareholder 
interference, they need good working capital markets, institutional investors and 
corporate governance. The nationality of the company is of minor importance in this 
model, which is close to the Anglo-Saxon neo-liberal variety of capitalism.  
 
The institutionalization of the Flemish space economy 
 
Since its 1830 inception, the Belgian state had to deal with a protracted language 
conflict and uneven geographical development. The handling of these problems by 
various social and political actors has produced two regions – Flanders and Wallonia 
– and locked them into different socio-economic trajectories. This is reflected in the 
rescaling of Belgium’s economic, political, and socio-cultural space. Steadily 
increasing geo-political rescaling over 150 years of Belgian history, e.g., through 
political and cultural struggles for regional autonomy and state restructuring, has 
finally produced the decentralization of Belgian political space. The anchoring debate 
likewise aims to transform Belgian economic space and is occurring just as geo-
economic rescaling is gathering pace through mechanisms such as European and 
world market integration, the rise of multinational network firms, and the resurgence 
of regional economies. This has created the space for pursuing anchoring strategies.  
 
Flemish nationalists have long considered the Flemish economy to be burdened by 
the overall Belgian space economy (Brockmans 1995). Based on holding capital, first 
industrial revolution firms, and other traditional sectors, the national economy is 
associated with the declining industrial spaces in Wallonia. Flemish nationalists 
criticized the close links between the Belgian political elite and the francophone 
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holding bourgeoisie, mainly organized around the Société Générale. These close 
links were partly based on the relations forged through the Belgian holdings’ strong 
presence in government procurement and infrastructure markets. Following the 
economic crisis of the 1970s, Flemish nationalists argued that this holding structure 
was blocking a thorough restructuring of outmoded or crisis-prone affiliated sectors 
and companies in the Belgian space economy. They also complained that these 
delays in restructuring were reinforced by the state support that the holding 
bourgeoisie, the Walloon socialist party and the Walloon trade unions could secure 
for loss-making companies through their privileged access to the Belgian 
government. Such subventions were said to divert money from future-directed 
economic investments, particularly for Flanders. Thus the foreign raid on the SG was 
applauded by Flemish nationalists because it would destroy the economic base of 
the Belgian francophone bourgeoisie and cause the disintegration of the Belgian 
space economy. It would also force SG to restructure and release its control over 
many (also Flemish) companies, which could then regain their dynamism.  
 
However, the Flemish nationalists also worried that the French acquisitions of SG 
and several big former state companies in the infrastructure and financial sector 
(e.g., Distrigas, Belgacom and ASLK) would actually increase francophone control 
over the strategic sectors of the Flemish economy. This shows that, despite the 
Flemish nationalist critique of the lack of dynamism and entrepreneurialism of the 
Belgian holdings, their economic imaginaries share the same traditional economic 
nationalist identification of national companies with national power. The fact that the 
French companies were especially targeting Belgian holdings closely related to the 
government (infrastructure and public procurement) meant that the acquired 
companies such as Electrabel, Tractebel and Distrigas could not be used as vehicles 
for Flemish geo-economic and geo-political purposes and/or as the basis for an 
autonomous Flemish bourgeoisie and the advancement of Flemish economic nation-
building. This argument is based on the national ownership version of the anchoring 
strategy. The corporate governance version also questioned the activities of Suez on 
the grounds that it is a holding company rather than because it is French – and this 
deviation from the best corporate governance standards mattered more than the 
nationality and political ties of the companies concerned.  
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Despite the discursive resonance (and hence retention) of the Flemish anchoring 
theme among a significant part of the Flemish political, intellectual and economic 
elites and its inclusion in the Flemish state project in the first half of the 1990s, the 
Flemish anchoring discourse has not been consolidated in institutional terms. 
Economically, the strategy has failed to mobilize the social forces needed to realize a 
structural transformation of the socio-economic relations of the economy in Flanders. 
Flemish capital is too small and insufficiently institutionalized to mobilize the financial 
resources to anchor the privatized state companies or holdings such as Société 
Générale. The Flemish merchant bank Lessius was a case in point. It was 
established in 1988 to create the financial structures for Flanders to intervene in 
important economic events such as the acquisition struggle around SG. Trends’ chief 
editor, Crols, regarded Lessius as a triumphant part of the emerging ‘Generale 
Maatschappij van Vlaanderen’ (‘SG of Flanders’) and said that it signalled the 
professionalisation of the Flemish business world (Crols 1988d). Lessius never lived 
up to these expectations. Despite its strong embedding in Flemish economic 
networks such as the Vlerick network, it failed to gain the size required to play its 
intended strategic role and was dissolved in 2005 (Desmet 2005). Apart from the lack 
of institutionalisation of Flemish capital, much of its economic basis lies in the service 
and non-monopolized industrial sectors that depend on the presence of foreign 
multinational companies in Flanders. Many Flemish economic decision-makers are 
thus more interested in maintaining the conditions for the reproduction of foreign 
monopoly capital in Flanders than in developing an economic basis for the Flemish 
nation (Roosens 1981). Nor has introducing corporate governance into Flanders 
increased Flemish strategic decision-making power. Recent economic events (see, 
for example, Suez’s acquisition of Electrabel) show that majority shareholders call 
the shots, however competent the local managers. More generally, one could argue 
that economic imaginaries based on a strong sense of boundedness are likely to fail 
as economic spaces are increasingly linked by cross-border networks.  
 
Despite the apparent failure of the Flemish anchoring strategy to fundamentally 
reconstitute Flemish economic space, it clearly belongs to a long-term and ongoing 
historical attempt to rescale economic relations and institutionalize an autonomous 
Flemish space for strategizing, interest formation and governance in Belgium. This is 
contributing to the further disintegration of Belgian political space as Flemings try to 
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remove the burden of the financial transfers from Flanders to Wallonia caused by its 
economic crisis and the strength of the Walloon socialist party and trade union. Thus 
the Flemish economic region-building agenda essentially aims to create a more 
favourable site of accumulation by eliminating an uncompetitive one. The 
institutionalization of the Flemish space economy therefore generates a new spatial 
and institutional fix, deferring the crisis-tendencies of global capitalism (literally) 
beyond its own boundaries, i.e. into Wallonia. This allows Flanders, at least for now, 
to better address the competitive pressures of the global market by allowing it to 
insert the Flemish space economy more favourably than the Belgian space economy 
into the global strategies of capital. The creation of Flemish ‘institutional thickness’ 
(Martin 2000) involves more than creating business assets and competitive 
institutional arrangements, as soft economic sociologists would have it, and extends 




Grossberg, a leading figure in cultural studies, argued that political economy cannot 
be relied on to develop the potential of the cultural turn, even when it takes the latter 
seriously, which is rare enough. For it ‘always assumes a universal privilege (and a 
decontextualized singularity) of the economy over politics and culture’ (2006: 19). 
Instead he recommends that the initiative be taken by scholars within cultural studies. 
Specifically, it should 
• engage with economics as discipline and not just with a preferred theorist 
or theorists;  
• address the concrete complexities of economic life, relations and 
discourses and not just treat theory as an adequate description of economic 
contexts;  
• get involved in collaborative work across disciplines rather than retreat into 
its own disciplinary boundaries; and  
• not unreflectively privilege forms of academic knowledge and knowledge 
production (2006: 20-21).  
We would respond that political economy should follow the same recommendations. 
Thus scholars of political economy should  
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• engage with cultural studies as a whole and not just with one preferred 
theorist or school,  
• address the complexities of semiosis and explore the discursive and 
material mechanisms that shape the manner and extent to which ‘ideas 
matter’ in political economy rather than merely asserting that they do and/or 
illustrating this with simple narrative accounts,  
• commit themselves to trans-disciplinary interaction or, better, sui generis 
post-disciplinary research rather than mechanically additive ‘multi-
disciplinary’ team work (on different forms of disciplinarity, see Jessop and 
Sum 2001), and 
• not unreflectively privilege forms of academic knowledge and knowledge 
production but examine in particular common sense economic imaginaries 
and actually existing struggles over their selection and retention. 
 
The approach to CPE sketched above is one way to respond to these challenges. 
Indeed, it would seem to correspond almost perfectly to the research agenda set for 
cultural studies by Grossberg in his provocative call to theoretical arms: 
 
Doing a different kind of – conjunctural – economics involves recognizing 
that the economy is not only overdetermined but also multiple, relational 
and discursive. For example, if we are to demystify both economies and 
economics, we probably need to recognize at least four distinct 
problematics: (1) economism, or the assumption that the economy (whether 
we understand as a mode of production, class conflicts, entrepreneurialism, 
technology, finance or markets) is the motor force of history, has to be 
criticized with the concept of overdetermination; (2) capitalocentrism -- or 
the assumption that capitalism in a singular and singularly ubiquitous 
formation, has to be replaced with a recognition of the multiplicity, not only 
of capitalisms but also of economic practices and formations (Gibson-
Graham 1996); (3) productivism or the assumption that production is the 
essence of economies and therefore, the fundamental; or even the only real 
source of value, has to be replaced by a recognition of the dispersion and 
contingency of value; and finally (4) economic essentialism or the 
assumption that there is a stable and universal distinction between 
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economic and non-economic practices or relations, has to be replaced by a 
recognition, not merely that economic relations are themselves partly 
discursive, but also that the economic is always a relationally produced 
category (Grossberg 2006: 21). 
 
We have argued for the cultural turn in economic and political geography (as part of a 
broader commitment, in our case at least, to a spatio-temporally sensitive political 
economy) on the grounds that this enables an escape from ‘hard political economy’, 
i.e., the naturalization and fetishization of economic categories without regard to their 
discursively mediated, socially constructed character. But we have also argued that 
the cultural turn should be combined with critical political economy, which we see as 
a broad movement rather than one linked exclusively to just one theorist, school, or 
tradition. This is one way to resist the temptation of ‘soft’ economic or political 
geographies characteristic of the new economic sociology and its importation into 
these fields (for a critique, see Peck 2005). We use the term ‘soft’ here to describe 
the subsumption of economic or political categories under general sociological (or 
cultural) analysis so that the analysis loses sight of the historical specificity and 
materiality of economics and the dynamics of state power. In developing CPE we 
have called for serious analysis of variation, selection, and retention in terms of 
semiotic and extra-semiotic mechanisms. This enables us to distinguish cultural 
political economy from critical discourse analysis in terms of its ‘value-added’. For, 
whereas critical discourse analysis tends to focus on specific texts, to undertake 
static comparative analyses of selected texts at different times, or to study linguistic 
corpora over time, CPE is also interested in the variation, selection, and retention of 
different discourses and, in this regard, is also concerned with their extra-semiotic as 
well as semiotic features. Our case study of Belgium illustrates how these 
mechanisms operate to select, retain, and reinforce specific imaginaries and thereby 
shape the concrete, contextualized, and contingent dynamics of a particular economy 
in its specific social and cultural settings as this changes over time. It also shows 
that, however resonant and persuasive an economic imaginary and its corresponding 
strategies might be, this is not sufficient to ensure that they can be realized when 
path-dependent (material as well as semiotic) legacies and the conjunctures 
(including the capacities and strategies of social forces mobilized behind competing 
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